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Abstract: Is the pattern of trade correlated with cross-sector differences in job turnover?   
Theoretically, external shocks feed through to changes in domestic employment and cross-sector 
differences in turnover give rise to compensating wage differentials, which feed through to 
output prices.  Using two different data sets on turnover, we find strong evidence that normalized 
US net exports by sector are negatively correlated with job destruction and worker separation 
rates. Weaker evidence suggests a positive correlation with between normalized net exports and 
job acquisition.  Using sector-specific job destruction data for both Canada and the US, we find 
confirmation of the theoretical prediction that normalized net exports to Canada are negatively 
related to the ratio of the US job destruction rate to the Canadian job destruction rate.   
                                                 
* For helpful discussions and comments, we thank Mary Amiti, Richard Disney, John Giles, Steven Haider, Daniel 
Hamermesh, James Harrigan, David Hummels, Christopher Magee, John McLaren, Douglas Nelson, Peter Schmidt, 
Richard Upward, Katharine Wakelin, Jeffrey Wooldridge and seminar participants at Michigan State University, the 
University of Nottingham, the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, the Spring 2001 meeting of the MWIEG 
conference, and the Fall 2001 meeting of the EIIT conference.   
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1. Introduction 
 
A view that seems to be commonly held by a significant portion of the public is that international 
trade generates forces that threaten job security, particularly in the US manufacturing sector.  
The basic idea is simple and intuitive – a sudden surge of imports in a sector intensifies 
competition, drives American firms out of business and destroys American jobs.  Of course, 
international trade could also have a positive effect on labor market outcomes -- a sudden 
increase in the demand for American made goods could lead to an increase in the number of jobs 
available as export sectors expand.  In either case, changes in the international trading 
environment create or destroy jobs, leading in turn to worker turnover.
1 
Recently, Carl Davidson, Lawrence Martin, and Steven Matusz (1999) have explored the 
implications that labor market turnover might have for net exports in a general equilibrium 
model of trade.  In the model that they construct, jobs are continuously created and destroyed at 
parametrically-given rates.  In order to attract and retain workers, sectors with above-average 
rates of job destruction or where jobs are harder than average to find need to compensate 
searching workers for their risk by paying higher than average wages.  Higher wages drive up 
production costs.  By adding a second country, DMM are able to relate exogenously-specified 
cross-country differences in turnover rates to endogenously-determined trade patterns.  In 
particular, holding all else constant, an increase in the rate at which jobs breakup in sector i in 
country C raises the cost of producing that good and erodes the country’s comparative advantage 
in that good (or aggravates its comparative disadvantage).  In this view of the world, 
exogenously given labor market turnover is an independent determinant of comparative 
advantage.
2 2 
  As we point out below, neither view of the world necessarily implies that we would 
observe a correlation between a country’s net exports and labor market turnover. However, both 
views are at least suggestive of a negative correlation between net exports in a given sector and 
the rate at which jobs are lost in that sector, with a positive correlation between net exports and 
the ease with which jobs are found in that sector.  Of course, the two theories differ in terms of 
what they take to be the exogenous cause and the endogenous effect.  The two also differ in that 
the first derives from a partial-equilibrium model linking changes in trade patterns or volumes to 
changes in employment (and therefore rates of job loss), whereas the second is grounded in a 
general-equilibrium framework describing a steady-state relationship between rates of job 
turnover and the pattern of trade. 
  Our purpose in this paper is to more fully articulate the two theories linking trade and 
turnover and then use data on job turnover, worker turnover and trade patterns to see if we can 
find empirical support for either theory.  Unlike earlier work that finds only weak evidence of a 
correlation between job turnover and changes in net exports, we find a very strong negative 
correlation between rates of job loss and the level of net exports.  Moreover, we also look at the 
connection between job acquisition rates and trade patterns, something that has not (to our 
knowledge) been explored in the literature.  We find some evidence that job acquisition rates are 
positively correlated with net exports, though the evidence here is not as strong as our evidence 
on the correlation between net exports and job loss.  This may be due to the fact that our measure 
of job acquisition does not conform as closely to the theoretical concept as does our measure of 
job loss.
3 3 
  In addition to finding these correlations, we attempt to sort out the cause-and-effect 
relationship.  Using a variety of different techniques, we find that the weight of the evidence 
suggests that it is more likely that turnover causes trade than vice versa.   
 
2.  From Trade to Turnover 
 
In a recent series of papers, Lori Kletzer (1998a, 1998b, 2000) finds some weak evidence to 
support the hypothesis that worker displacement rates are positively correlated with the degree of 
foreign competition.
4  Before reporting Kletzer’s empirical findings, it is useful to describe the 
conceptual framework that underlies her empirical implementation.  This is best done with 
reference to Figure 1. 
  Consider a partial equilibrium model of a single good produced in two countries (the US 
and a Foreign country) under conditions of perfect competition and increasing marginal cost.  
The left hand panel of Figure 1 represents the US market for this good, while the right hand 
panel represents the Foreign market.  The US and Foreign demand as well as the US and Foreign 
supply for this good are taken as exogenous.  All quantities and prices are endogenously 
determined in equilibrium. 
  As drawn, the US would be a net importer of this good.  The equilibrium price of this 
good can be found by adding the Foreign excess supply curve to the US supply curve and then 
finding the intersection of the resulting summation with the US demand curve.
5  Assuming that 
no goods are lost in transit, the quantity of US imports ( ) US M  must equal the quantity of Foreign 
exports () F X .  The import-penetration ratio for this good can be defined as  ()
D
US US Q M m = .  
Suppose now that there is some change in the Foreign market that induces the exogenously-
specified Foreign supply curve to shift to the right.  Examples of such shocks might include 
technological improvement, reduction in the cost of some important input, or change in 4 
government legislation.  From Figure 1, it is evident that this shock will cause (a) a decrease in 
the world price of the product; (b) an increase in the quantity demanded in the US; (c) a decrease 
in the quantity supplied in the US; and (d) an increase in the quantity of the good imported by the 
US from the Foreign country.  In turn, (b) and (d) combined imply that the shock creates an 
increase in the import-penetration ratio.  Assuming, as is natural, that US employment is 
positively related to the quantity supplied in the US, the exogenous shock to the Foreign supply 
curve creates a negative correlation between the endogenously-determined import-penetration 
ratio and US employment and a positive correlation between the endogenously-determined world 
price of the product and the US employment rate. 
  Kletzer generalizes this comparative static, postulating that shocks occur every time 













1  (1) 
where  t N  is industry employment in period t, and a is the rate of unreplaced attritions (e.g., 
voluntary quits that are not replaced by new hires).   
  Based upon this framework and using these definitions, Kletzer tests the hypothesis that 
t i d ,  is positively related to  t i m , ∆  and negatively related to changes in  t i P, ∆ , where the subscript i 
is used to denote an industry and where ∆ is the first-difference operator. 
  There are two fundamental problems with this approach, both of which are acknowledged 
by Kletzer.
6  The first, as already noted, is that both  t i m , and  t i P,  are endogenous.  It is because of 
this endogeneity problem that Kletzer is careful about not attributing causality to the results. 
  The second problem is that the model is also consistent with a negative correlation 
between  t i d ,  and  t i m , ∆  and a positive correlation between  t i d ,  and  t i P, ∆ .  For example, suppose 5 
that there is an exogenous increase in US demand.  This creates an unambiguous increase in the 
equilibrium price of the product, inducing greater US production and employment (less 
displacement).  The import-penetration ratio could increase as well if the Foreign excess supply 
curve is more elastic than the US supply curve.  In this case, there would be a negative 
correlation between  t i d ,  and  t i m , ∆ .
7  Alternatively, suppose that there is a negative shock to US 
supply, causing the aggregate supply of goods to the US market to shift leftward.  In this case, 
the price of the good unambiguously increases, but the quantity produced domestically (and 
therefore employment) might actually fall, creating a positive correlation between   t i d ,  and  t i P, ∆ .  
It is not possible to sort out these conflicting relationships in the absence of data relating to both 
US and Foreign shocks. 
  With the above model in mind, Kletzer (2000) created a panel combining data from the 
Displaced Workers Survey with price and quantity data on international trade to test the 
hypotheses that  t i d , is positively related to  t i m , ∆ and negatively related to  t i P, ∆ .  To do so, she 
regressed  t i d , on  t i m , ∆ ,  t i P, ∆ , and a variety of control variables.  Of the 15 regressions  that use 
t i m , ∆  as the independent variable of interest, the point estimate of the slope coefficient is positive 
in all but two cases.  In the two cases where the estimated slope coefficient is negative, it is not 
possible to reject the null hypothesis that the true value is actually zero.  Indeed, of the remaining 
13 cases, the t-statistic ranges from 0.15 to  3.04, exceeding 1.5 in only 5 instances.  Of the 10 
regressions where  t i P, ∆ was the key independent variable, one resulted in a positive point 
estimate of the slope coefficient, though it was not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the 
true coefficient is zero.  In the remaining 9 cases, the t-statistics ranged from 0.30 to 2.10, with 
only three instances in which the value was larger than 1.5.  In summary, Kletzer’s results 6 
provide only weak evidence that increased international competition is correlated with greater 
worker displacement. 
 
3.  From Turnover to Trade 
In contrast to the static, partial equilibrium-model that motivates the intuition suggesting that 
trade shocks cause labor market turnover, DMM developed a dynamic general-equilibrium 
model to show that cross-country and cross-industry differences in labor market turnover can be 
an independent source of comparative advantage and therefore help shape the equilibrium pattern 
of trade. 
  Consider a simplified version of the DMM model where labor is the only input.
8  Assume 
that there are two goods and two countries.  Suppose that each worker can produce a single unit 
of either good regardless of country, so that in the absence of any other considerations there 
would be no basis for trade.  Finally, suppose that in each country workers live forever and 
alternate between spells of employment and spells of unemployment.  In particular, we assume 
that existing jobs breakup and new jobs are acquired according to a Poisson process, where we 
let 
k
i b  represent the job breakup rate and 
k
i e  the job acquisition rate for sector i in country k.  We 
take these parameters as exogenous, though they would clearly be determined in part by 
optimizing behavior in a more sophisticated model.  Because of the implied frictions in the labor 
market, there will always be some job loss even if a sector is expanding, and there will always be 
some job gains even if a sector is contracting.
9 
  Unemployed workers choose a sector in which to search for a job.  Assuming that 
workers are risk neutral, it is necessarily the case that diversified production necessitates that 
(appropriately discounted) expected lifetime income must be the same across sectors.
10  This 7 
income is a weighted average of the income earned while unemployed (zero) and the income 
earned while on the job.  We assume here that a worker earns the entire value of his marginal 
product, which is simply i P .  Using  i V  to represent the discounted value of lifetime income, it is 
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where r is the subjective rate of discount.  As already noted, diversified production requires 















= . (3) 
If the  2 P increases relative to 1 P , all searchers flow to sector 2 and the economy eventually 
specializes to the production of good 2.  The reverse happens if  2 P falls relative to 1 P .  We 
illustrate equilibrium in the absence of trade by reference to the relative supply and relative 
demand curves in Figure 2. 
In this model, turnover rates are the exogenous shifters of relative supply.  If  2 b increases 
(or  2 e decreases), all else equal, the price of good 2 must increase in order to continue attracting 
workers to that sector.  The intuition for this result is akin to that of a compensating wage 
differential.  Holding all other factors constant, sectors that have relatively high breakup rates 
need to pay higher wages to encourage prospective employees to accept jobs within that sector 
rather than in a sector where jobs are more secure.  Similarly, jobs that are relatively difficult to 
obtain (that is, where  i e  is relatively small) need to offer a wage premium to induce prospective 
employees to undertake the time and effort needed to obtain a job in that sector rather than 
another sector where jobs are easier to obtain.
12   8 
  The implication for trade theory is that a country should have a comparative advantage in 
sectors where the breakup rate is low and/or the job acquisition rate is high relative to the same 
sector in other countries. This would seem to imply that export industries should be characterized 
by relatively low wages while import-competing industries should be characterized by high 
wages.  Given the strong evidence to the contrary in the United States, it would appear that this is 
prima fascia evidence against the model.  However, this would be a misinterpretation of the 
model.  In particular, each category of labor (skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled, and so on) has to be 
compensated for increased job risk, but this will not impinge on the rank ordering of wages 
across skill groups.  Since US exports are relatively intensive in the use of high-skilled labor, 
average wages should be higher than in import-competing industries.  
Our intent in the remainder of this paper is to use available data on job turnover, worker 
turnover, and trade patterns to see if we can find support for our theoretical findings.
13  To 
preview our results, we do indeed find strong evidence that higher rates of job destruction or 
worker separations are associated with a smaller level of net exports.
14  This correlation emerges 
from the data even after controlling for other variables that are likely to be associated with the 
volume and pattern of trade.  We also use job creation and worker accessions to create a proxy 
for the job acquisition rate.  While we do find that our proxy for job acquisitions is positively 
correlated with net trade, the correlation is not as strong as that relating net trade with job 
destruction or worker separations.  As we note in our discussion of the data, our proxy for the job 
acquisition rate only loosely approximates the theoretical counterpart.  By contrast, both the job 
destruction rate and the job separation rate are reasonably good proxies for the breakup rate that 
shows up in the theoretical model.
15 
 9 
4. The  Data
16 
As indicated in the introduction, we make use of two distinct sets of data on labor market 
turnover. The purpose of this section is to describe this data and discuss the conceptual fit 
between the data and the theoretical underpinnings of the general-equilibrium model presented in 
the previous section.
17 
The data underlying the statistical analysis of job creation and destruction undertaken by 
DHS is the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) that was developed by the United States 
Census Bureau.  While the original establishment-level data is not available for public use, DHS 
have aggregated the data to the sectoral level and made these data freely available for anyone to 
use.
18 
The LRD combined data from the quinquennial census of manufactures with annual 
survey data to ascertain, inter alia, establishment-level employment numbers.
19  The survey asks 
respondents to list the number of employees (both full time and part time) on the payroll as of a 
specified pay period in March of the designated year.  Since the same establishments were 
surveyed every year, DHS were able to track plant-level employment changes.
20 
To generate job creation and job destruction data for any particular grouping of 
establishments (for example, by SIC) for year t, DHS first divide the entire set of establishments 
into three groups.  The first group includes all of those establishments that had more employees 
on the payroll in March of year t than they did in March of year t-1.  Call this set of 
establishments 
+ S .  The second group includes all of those establishments that had fewer 
employees on the payroll in March of year t than they did in the previous March.  The set of 
establishments in this group is denoted by 
− S .  Of course the remaining establishments 10 
(presumably accounting for only a very small share of overall manufacturing employment) 
constitute the set of establishments for which there was no change in employment. 
Considering only those establishments in the set 
+ S , DHS define the gross number of 
new jobs created as the sum of all employment increases between year t-1 and year t.  To convert 
this into a job creation rate, DHS divide by the average aggregate employment level of all firms 
in sector S between t-1 and t.  That is, if Net represents employment at establishment e in March 
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where the lower case letter refers to a rate, while the upper case letter refers to a level. 
  While this job creation variable is certainly very interesting for many purposes, it is not 
what we have in mind by the job acquisition parameter represented by  i e  in the introduction of 
this paper.  The problem is that it does not really tell us how easy or hard it is for an unemployed 
worker to find a job in a particular sector, nor does it tell us how easy or hard it is for a firm with 
vacancies to find appropriate employees.  Expanding establishments may hire many workers 
relative to their existing employment base, yet this may only be a small fraction of the workers 
who are looking for a job in that sector, implying that it is relatively easy for firms to find 
workers, but difficult for the unemployed to find jobs.  Similarly, a small job creation rate could 
possibly be associated with a small pool of workers looking for employment in that sector, and 
therefore correspond to relatively easy entrée into the sector, but possibly higher costs of 
recruiting.  Even so, it is possible to use this measure to tease out an expression that has some 
bearing on the issue at hand. 11 
  The supply of new jobs created by firms in sector S relative to the aggregate number of 
new jobs created by manufacturing firms in all sectors combined provides some sense of the 
relative magnitude of job creation emanating from sector S.  That is, a sector could have a 
relatively low job creation rate but be responsible for the lion’s share of new jobs created in the 
manufacturing sector if that sector accounts for a relatively large portion of base employment.  
To calculate our proxy of the job acquisition rate, which we denote by  t i e , , define  t i, λ  as the 
share of total manufacturing employment in year t accounted for by sector i.  The employment-
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Furthermore, the share of jobs accounted for by sector j is simply 
t
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  We shall refer to  t i e ,  as the job acquisition rate in the remainder of this paper.  However, 
we note here that the measure represented by (7) is not a perfect proxy for the true job 
acquisition rate, since we know nothing about the pool of workers suited for employment in 
different sectors.  For example, some sectors are intensive in the use of skilled labor; others are 
intensive in the use of unskilled labor.  It may be that eis relatively small for a sector that uses 
highly skilled labor.  However, if the pool of qualified workers is also small, it may not be all 
that difficult to obtain employment in this sector. 
  The DHS measure of job destruction is calculated in a manner analogous to the job 
creation rate.  However, this measure is much closer to our concept of the breakup rate, 
represented by  i b , that is pivotal in our theoretical model.  Following the DHS notation, we use 12 
the symbol  t s D , to represent the gross number of jobs destroyed between period  1 − t  and period 

















1 , . (9) 
  Because the DHS measure of job destruction is a close approximation of the job breakup 
parameter in the general equilibrium model, we shall simply let  t s t s d b , , = . 
  While the DHS data captures annual changes in the number of jobs at an establishment, 
the BLS data focuses squarely on worker accessions and separations.  Labor market turnover as 
reported by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics represent the gross movement of 
workers into (accessions) and out of (separations) employment at the level of individual 
establishments.  This data was reported in Table D-2 of Employment and Earnings until 1981, 
when collection of this data ceased because of budgetary reasons.
22  To see the difference 
between job flows and worker flows, note that an establishment might experience a 10 percent 
separation rate during the course of the year (due to retirements, quits, or layoffs) at the same 
time that it has a 10 percent accession rate (consisting of new hires and rehires).  This 
establishment would end the year with the same number of employees as it had at the beginning 
of the year, and would therefore not exhibit any job creation or destruction, yet turnover would 
be substantial.  Turnover in the DHS data requires heterogeneity between establishments, while 
turnover in the BLS data may exist due to heterogeneity of worker experience within 
establishments.
 23 
  The BLS measure of job accessions is subject to the same weakness as the DHS measure 
of job creation is vis-à-vis the match with the theoretical model.  Therefore we handle this 13 
variable in the same way that we handle the DHS measure of job creation.  That is, we construct 
a proxy for job accession that for each industry is the job accession rate multiplied by the 
industry’s share of manufacturing employment relative to the average accession rate in 
manufacturing. 
  Both sets of turnover data are reported at the 2-digit and 4-digit SIC level (based on the 
1972 revision to SIC codes).  However, the DHS data encompasses 447 4-digit industries per 
year, while the BLS data only covers 106 such industries.  The DHS data is available for the 
years 1973-1986, while the BLS data is available for the years 1978-1981.   
In order to look for a correlation between job turnover and trade patterns, we combine the 
DHS and BLS datasets with data on US trade that was compiled by Robert Feenstra and made 
available from the National Bureau of Economic Research.
24  To control for a variety of 
industry-specific characteristics that could be associated with both job destruction and trade 
patterns, we also use data from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database.
25 
 
5. First  Impressions 
In order to explore the possible connection between labor market turnover and trade patterns, we 
must first choose a way to measure the degree to which an industry is engaged in international 
trade.  To this end, we represent our measure of net exports in industry i at time t by  t i T ,  and 
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where  t i E ,  ,  t i M , , and  t i Q ,  represent gross exports, imports, and production attributed to sector i 
during year t.  This measure ranges between +100 (if there are no imports and if all output is 14 
exported) to –100 (if there is no domestic production and no re-export of imports).
26  T h e  
intuition following from the general-equilibrium model in Section 3 of this paper loosely 
suggests that the United States should have a comparative advantage in industries with relatively 
high job acquisition rates and relatively low job destruction rates.
27  Therefore, we might expect 
to see a positive correlation between our proxy for the job acquisition rate and the trade index, 
and observe a negative correlation between job destruction rates and the trade index. 
  Our initial findings are shown in Table 1.  In all regressions, the dependent variable is our 
measure of normalized net trade.  The first four regressions are based upon the DHS turnover 
data, with the remaining four based upon the BLS turnover data.  For controls, we used real 
capital per worker and the ratio of production workers to total employment, both of which vary 
by industry and by year.
28   In addition, we use a trade-weighted index of the value of the dollar, 
which varies by year but not by industry.
29  Since we are only interested in the signs of the 
turnover variables, we do not report point estimates for any of the remaining control variables or 
year dummies. 
  The results reported in Table 1 indicate a highly significant relationship between job 
turnover and net trade.  As expected, the point estimates for the coefficient on the breakup rate 
are negative, and those for the coefficients on the proxy for the job acquisition rate are always 
positive.  Moreover, they are estimated with a high degree of precision, as indicated by very low 
p-values. 
  In terms of magnitude, the point estimates suggest that the elasticity of the absolute value 
of the trade index with respect to b ranges from -0.34 to -0.53 based upon the DHS data, and -
0.97 to -1.33 when based upon the BLS data.  The comparable ranges for the elasticity of the 15 
absolute value of T with respect to eare much smaller, ranging from 0.04 to 0.07 when based 
upon the DHS data, and 0.18 to 0.22 using the BLS data.
30 
  While the turnover variables are exogenous in the theoretical formulation of the simple 
model, it might be reasonable to suppose that they would be endogenous in a more elaborate 
model.
31  Moreover, there are clearly some important variables missing from our regression 
analysis, the most obvious being turnover rates in the rest of the world.  To the extent that these 
rates are highly correlated with US turnover rates, we would expect our coefficients to be biased 
toward zero.
32  In order to handle these issues, it would be desirable to instrument for turnover.  
The problem in this case is that all known correlates of turnover are also variables that 
presumably have some impact on trade.  We attempt to circumvent this problem by using 
1 , − t i b  , 2 , − t i b ,  1 , − t i e , and  2 , − t i e  to instrument for  t i b , and  t i e , .
33  We report the outcome from the 
resulting two-stage least-squares regressions in Table 2.  Clearly, the qualitative results are 
unchanged, with all of the point estimates being of the proper sign and the coefficients being 
precisely measured.  We note also that the magnitudes of the point estimates are larger in these 
regressions, a result that we might have suspected due to the nature of the unobserved variables. 
 
6.  Which Way Does it Go? 
As we observed in Sections 2 and 3 of this paper, using only US data severely limits our ability 
to address the issue of causality.  In the partial equilibrium model, the relationship between trade 
and turnover depends upon the origin of the shocks that cause the turnover.  In the general 
equilibrium model, the pattern of trade cannot genuinely be predicted without reference to 
turnover rates in all trading partners, an issue to which we return in the next section of the paper.  16 
For now, however, we undertake three separate analyses, the results of which appear to be more 
consistent with the direction of causality running from turnover to trade, rather than the reverse. 
  Our first analysis is based on the idea that the general equilibrium model runs off of 
forward-looking agents doing what is in their own self interest.  Agents base their decisions on 
long-run characteristics of sectors, not transitory shocks.  By contrast, the partial equilibrium 
model is all about the effect of trade shocks on changes in turnover rates.  The implication is that 
if we regress net trade on average values of turnover ( ) e b and  and their (percent) deviation from 
the average () e b ∆ ∆ and , the point estimates for the coefficients of b  should be negative and 
e should be positive if the general-equilibrium interpretation (turnover causes trade) holds sway, 
while the point estimates of the coefficients of  b ∆ should be negative and those of  e ∆  positive if 
the partial equilibrium interpretation (trade causes turnover) is more important.
34 
  We report the results of this analysis in Table 3.  The estimated coefficients of b  and 
e all have the right sign under the general-equilibrium interpretation and are precisely measured.  
The estimated coefficient for  b ∆ is negative, as would be expected under the partial equilibrium 
interpretation, but standard errors are so large that it is not reasonable to reject the null 
hypothesis that the true value of the coefficient is zero.  The estimates for the coefficient of  e ∆  
have the expected sign when the DHS turnover data is used, and they are marginally significant 
as long as we do not include year dummies.  However, the point estimates using the BLS 
turnover data have the wrong sign.  Fortunately, in this case, it is not reasonable to reject the 
hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero. 
  Our second approach is closely related to the first.  Here, we take advantage of the fact 
that we have panel data and employ an industry fixed-effects estimation.  It is easy to think of 
unobserved factors that vary by industry, including trade barriers, workforce demographics, 17 
geographic dispersion of production facilities, rate of technological change, number of foreign 
competitors, degree of product differentiation, returns to scale, and so on.  Some of these factors 
are unlikely to change dramatically over a relatively short time, and these are the factors intended 
to be captured with the fixed-effects approach. 
  What should we expect of this approach?  As we already observed, if the general 
equilibrium story is correct, implying that forward looking agents make decisions based on long-
run turnover rates, then temporary deviations of the turnover rates from their long run averages 
should not influence trade patterns.  By contrast, if the partial equilibrium approach is correct, 
trade shocks should cause turnover rates to deviate from their long-run averages. The fixed-
effects estimation de-trends both the dependent and independent variables, leaving only 
deviations from the average.  Therefore, we would expect that we could not reject the hypothesis 
of zero effect of turnover on trade if the general equilibrium hypothesis is correct, but we would 
see statistically significant results with breakup rates having a negative impact and job 
acquisition rates a positive impact on net exports. 
  The results of our fixed-effects estimation are shown in Table 4.  In all cases, it is not 
reasonable to reject the hypothesis that the true coefficient of the job acquisition rate is zero.  
However, the point estimate for the coefficient on the breakup rate is negative in all cases and 
highly significant in three of the four cases based on DHS data.  The evidence provided by these 
regressions is therefore mixed. 
  Our third approach exploits the intuition that trade shocks in the partial equilibrium 
framework ought to have an asymmetric impact on breakup rates and acquisition rates.
35  In 
particular, a trade shock that causes an industry to have a high breakup rate should also cause 
that same industry to have a low acquisition rate, and vice-versa.  If we only look at industries 18 
where both turnover rates are high, or where both are low, we ought to find no correlation with 
trade if the partial equilibrium framework is dominant. 
  To implement this approach, we created a series of indicator variables that took on a 
value of one if the observation had both a low breakup rate and a low acquisition rate, or a high 
breakup rate and a high acquisition rate.  We then interacted these indicator variables with the 
breakup and acquisition rates.  The partial effect of b on T for observations where both b and e 
are either in the top or bottom 10 percent of their respective distributions would then be found by 
summing the estimated coefficients on the relevant interaction terms with the estimated 
coefficient on b.  Our results are reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
  The key findings are in Table 6.  While the sum of the relevant coefficients is rarely 
statistically significant when considering the impact of job acquisitions on trade, the sum of the 
relevant coefficients on job destruction are almost always negative and statistically significant 
regardless of how far into the tails of the distribution we look.  The one exception concerns the 
most extreme values of turnover using the BLS data (where b and e are both in the upper or 
lower 10 percent of their respective distribution).  In this latter case, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that there is no effect of turnover on trade. 
 
7. Additional  Evidence 
The three tests discussed in the previous section are informative, but certainly not conclusive.  
An airtight test of either the partial equilibrium or the general equilibrium model absolutely 
requires data from multiple countries.  In the case of the partial equilibrium model, we get the 
expected correlations between import penetration or import prices and worker displacement only 
if shocks originate in the Foreign country, which is an implicitly maintained assumption of the 19 
analysis.
36  In the case of the general equilibrium model, comparative advantage depends on 
differences between countries.  Suppose, for example, that sector 1 has a higher breakup rate 
than sector 2 in all countries.  Since some country has to be a net exporter of good 1, there has to 
be at least one country that has a comparative advantage in the high turnover good, and data for 
that country would show a positive correlation between net exports and the breakup rate.  We 
could add another assumption to the general equilibrium model to allow us to infer that for the 
United States the correlation is negative (as observed in the  data), but we would be subject to the 
charge of ex post theorizing.
37   
  Fortunately, we can start to address this issue head on.  In their cross-country comparison 
of job turnover, Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998) report average job creation and job 
destruction rates over the period 1994-1992 for nineteen 2-digit SIC industries in the United 
States and Canada.
38  We can combine this data with data on bilateral trade between the United 
States and Canada to more closely approximate a true test of the underlying theory.  Roughly 
speaking, the theory suggests that US exports to Canada should be highest in industries where 
US job destruction rates are lowest relative to Canadian job destruction rates.
39  More 









TC  (11) 
where for industry i in year t  it EC represents US exports to Canada and  it MC represents US 
imports from Canada.  This is simply net exports to Canada normalized by the total amount of 
trade (between the United States and all countries) associated with industry i in year t.  The 
theory suggests that this index should be negatively correlated with the ratio of the industry-
specific averages of US job destruction relative to Canadian job destruction rates.  20 
 We  regressed  it TC against the ratio of job destruction rates for nineteen 2-digit SIC 
industries for the years 1974-1994, providing a total of 399 observations.  As is evident from 
Figure 3, there is indeed a negative relationship between (normalized) net exports from the US to 
Canada and the ratio of job destruction rates.  The estimated slope coefficient in this Figure is 
highly statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.000 and the regression line fits the data well as 
suggested by  30 . 0
2 = R .  While this result is certainly based on a very limited data set, we find it 




There are sound theoretical reasons to believe that labor market turnover is linked to 
international trade, though competing theories offer different mechanisms.  In point of fact, these 
theories are not mutually exclusive, and a more encompassing model that nests the two would 
likely suggest that external shocks impinge on domestic labor market turnover while cross-
country differences in the fundamental determinants of labor market turnover contribute to the 
determination of the pattern of comparative advantage.   
  The evidence that we report in this paper, based on two different sources of data for labor 
market turnover, points to a very strong negative correlation between net exports and rates of job 
loss.  There is also some evidence that job acquisition rates are positively correlated with net 
exports, but that evidence is weaker, perhaps due to the relatively imperfect measure that we 
have for job acquisition rates. 21 
  Taken in its entirety, we believe that the evidence presented in this paper provides 
sufficient grounds to encourage further research using alternative data and a sample of different 
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1 See also Jagdish Bhagwati and Vivek Dehejia (1994) and Bhagwati (1998) who provide a 
slightly different theory of how trade affects turnover.  According to their theory, dramatic 
reductions in transportation costs, increases in the speed of communications, and rapidly 
evolving research have led to a global economy where profit margins are razor thin.  Thus, they 
argue that countries can gain or lose the competitive edge in any particular market almost 
instantly.  In turn, this “kaleidoscopic” comparative advantage creates increased employment 
volatility as firms that lose their competitive edge exit the market, replaced by new industry 
leaders.  
2 The intuition underlying the Davidson, Martin and Matusz (DMM) assertion is based on one of 
the main lessons from general-equilibrium trade theory -- that comparative advantage is the 
result of the interaction of intersectoral differences with cross-country differences.  In the 
Ricardian model, comparative advantage arises because labor productivity differs between 
countries and (for at least one country) between sectors.  Comparative advantage in the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model is the result of cross-sector differences in factor intensities 
combined with cross-country differences in factor supplies.  In the DMM world, it is differences 
in labor market turnover across industries and countries that drive trade patterns. 
3 Many researchers have studied the way that international competition has shaped the 
distribution of employment across sectors.  See for example Gene Grossman (1987) and Ana 
Revenga (1992, 1997).  This is a distinctly different line of research.  As we show below, trade 
can be related to turnover in the labor market even when the cross-sector composition of 
employment does not change.  
4 Jon Haveman (1998), using a somewhat different empirical methodology, finds similar results.   27 
5 For simplicity, we abstract from both natural and artificial barriers to trade, so that trade 
equalizes the equilibrium price across markets. 
6 There are some secondary problems as well.  For example, there is an implicit assumption that 
this is the market for a final good.  If this is an intermediate good, then stiffer foreign 
competition might cost jobs in this sector but increase jobs in the downstream sector where costs 
fall.  If these two “sectors” are narrowly defined so that both fit into the same classification given 
the data constraints, increased foreign competition would be associated with higher sector-
specific employment (lower displacement).  In addition, ignoring job acquisitions leads to some 
curious empirical puzzles.  For example, Kletzer identifies some sectors that have persistently 
high (but relatively stable, or even declining) import-penetration ratios and high rates of worker 
displacement.  Assuming that final demand is roughly constant, displacements that are not 
ultimately replaced ought to lead to a secular decline in domestic output and higher import-
penetration ratios.   
7 Even in the event that the import-penetration ratio fell, leading to the hypothesized positive 
correlation, the underlying chain of cause-and-effect works from the exogenous change in 
domestic demand to the simultaneously-determined displacement rate and import-penetration 
ratio.  This just re-states the endogeneity problem. 
8 The DMM model consists of two factors, allowing for diversified production over a non-
degenerate range of prices. 
9 This feature of the model is consistent with the data on gross flows, as suggested by Steven 
Davis and John Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh (1996). 
10 Since workers live forever, we should technically talk about income discounted over the 
infinite future, but this phrase seems unnecessarily awkward. 28 
11 See Davidson, et. al. (1999) for the derivation. 
12 Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981) find empirical support for the proposition that inter-industry 
wage differentials compensate for differences across industries in the risk of unemployment.  In 
their work, they assume that a worker can choose to accept a job in a sector where there is no 
constraint on labor supply, or accept employment in a sector where labor supply is constrained.  
They assume that the expected value of the constraint is known, but the actual constraint is 
random.  In equilibrium, worker indifference between the two sectors implies that the 
constrained sector must pay a higher wage.  The authors use data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (1967-1975) to estimate the effect of unemployment uncertainty on the wage 
differential.  They conclude that the compensating differentials ranged from less than one percent 
in industries where there was relatively little anticipated unemployment, to as much as fourteen 
percent in industries where there was a relatively large amount of anticipated unemployment. 
13 In that our work is motivated by an assumption of cross-country differences in the pattern of 
labor market turnover, our work is related to the recently growing literature in which a variety of 
authors have argued that cross-country differences in labor market structure can have interesting 
and important implications for a host of issues.  For example, Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell, 
and Richard Jackman (1991) have investigated the implications of such differences for 
macroeconomic stability while Richard Freeman (1994) has explored how such differences 
affect the pattern of job training.  Paul Krugman (1994) has argued that the different manner in 
which recent changes in technology and trade patterns have filtered through economies can be 
linked to the differences in their labor market structures.  He points out that the United States, 
with its flexible, high turnover labor market has been characterized by a dramatic change in the 
distribution of income while European countries, with their rigid, relatively low turnover labor 29 
markets, have been characterized by a dramatic increase in unemployment among low skilled 
workers.  Donald Davis (1998) makes a similar point when he shows how countries with 
downwardly rigid wages may be insulated from trade shocks if their trading partners have 
flexible labor markets that allow them to absorb such shocks.  See also the recent paper by 
Olivier Blanchard and Augustin Landier (2001) who relate turnover (a labor market outcome) 
with French institutional reform undertaken in the 1980s that provided firms with wider leeway 
in hiring workers under fixed term contracts (rather than standard contracts of indefinite term).  
In turn, this has allowed firms more flexibility in terminating workers since firms are permitted 
to more easily terminate workers who were employed on fixed term contracts.  However, firms 
are subject to a substantially higher level of firing costs in the event that workers are kept on 
beyond the duration of the contract.  Blanchard and Landier argue on theoretical grounds that 
this sort of policy could set up perverse incentives for firms to terminate workers on fixed term 
contracts even when the quality of the match appears good, thus creating higher turnover.  They 
provide empirical evidence that this has indeed been the case. 
14 Of course, we normalize our trade variables to account for size variation across sectors. 
15 It is perhaps worth noting that we might expect turnover to exert an independent influence on 
the costs of production, and hence on the pattern of comparative advantage, even in the absence 
of the general-equilibrium effects that were formally modeled in Davidson, et. al. (1999).  The 
reason is that turnover itself is costly.  Presumably, firms need to expend resources to train newly 
hired employees and to find and recruit replacements for those who leave.  Holding all else 
constant, higher turnover is more costly. 
16 We are happy to provide all of our data along with the Stata “do file” to anyone wishing to 
further explore our results. 30 
17 Of course the authoritative (and complete) description of the DHS dataset is provided in the 
Appendix to their book. 
18 Recently, Michael Klein, Scott Schuh, and Robert Triest (2002, 2003) have used the DHS data 
to examine the impact of exchange rate movements on turnover.  Davis, et. al. (1996, p. 175) 
explicitly looked for a link between turnover and the degree of import penetration or export 
performance and found “…no systematic relationship between the magnitude of gross job flows 
and exposure to international trade.”  However, theirs was a very superficial analysis, consisting 
of a simple cross-tabulation, dividing industries into quintiles (based on import penetration ratios 
on the one hand, or the share of output devoted to exports on the other) and then reporting the 
weighted average job destruction and creation rates of 4-digit SIC sectors within each quintile.  
They do not undertake any sort of formalized hypothesis testing. 
19 In this context, an establishment is a plant employing (generally speaking) five or more 
workers. 
20 Establishments rotated in and out of the sample at 5-year intervals. 
21 DHS report the annual employment-weighted job creation rates for the US in Table 2.1. 
22 The BLS data was classified according to 1967 SIC codes prior to 1978, and discontinued after 
1981.  Note, however, that the 1981 data is reported in the March 1982 issue of Employment and 
Earnings. 
23 See Davis and Haltiwanger (1998) for a lucid discussion of the differences between worker 
flows and job flows, along with a description of the available data for each.   
24 See Feenstra (1996, 1997) for a description of the trade data. 31 
25 This data is maintained by Eric Bartelsman, Randy Becker, and Wayne Gray and is available 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research.  A description of this data is provided in 
Bartelsman and Gray (1996). 
26 The qualitative nature of our results are substantially unaffected if instead we were to use 
either import penetration  or exports as a share of output as our dependent variable.   
27 This is only a loose interpretation since what really matters for the pattern of trade is 
differences in the pattern of job destruction rates across countries.  Our data only applies to the 
United States, so we do not have a direct test of this hypothesis.  We return to this issue in the 
conclusion of the paper. 
28 By including these variables, we are in no way attempting to test the factor endowment basis 
for trade.  Indeed, it has been well known at least since Leamer’s (1984) work that such 
regressions are not appropriate tests of that model.  Our only intent is to control for some obvious 
factors that might be correlated with the trade index to see if we can still observe any correlation 
with respect to job turnover rates. 
29 The exchange rate index is from the Economic Report of the President and is the G-10 index.   
30 We evaluated all elasticities at the mean value of the data.  The mean value of  T  is 8.7 in the 
DHS data, and 8.4 in the BLS data.  The mean value of b is 11.1 in the DHS data and 3.7 in the 
BLS data.  The mean value of e is 0.2 in the DHS data and 0.9 in the BLS data. 
31 Even in a more elaborate model, however, one would imagine that some element of turnover 
would remain exogenous.  For example, we typically assume that production technology is 
exogenous.  In the case of turnover, we might assume that there exists a matching technology 
and that this technology is exogenous, even if the particular point along the function is 
endogenous. 32 
32 In the most extreme case, turnover rates would not be an independent source of comparative 
advantage if industry-specific turnover rates were the same in all countries. 
33 We thank both Richard Disney and an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
34 We thank David Hummels for suggesting this approach. 
35 We thank John McLaren for suggesting this insight. 
36 Of course, if the shocks originate in the Foreign country, then analysis of the Foreign data 
ought to show the opposite correlations between import share and worker displacement. 
37 For example, if the rank order of breakup rates is the same in all countries, but the dispersion 
is higher in the US, then (abstracting from differences in acquisition rates) it is easy to show that 
the US will have the comparative advantage in industries characterized by the lowest breakup 
rates.   
38 The data is reported in their Table 2.  The reason that there are only nineteen industries is that 
they combine industries 38 (instruments) and 39 (miscellaneous products).  They note in a 
footnote that there are slight discrepancies in industry definitions across countries. 
39 Lacking appropriate data to weight values of job creation, it is not possible to construct a 
proxy for job acquisition and therefore we cannot use a comparison of US and Canadian job 
creation data in our analysis. 
40 In a separate paper, written with Christopher Magee, we find empirical support for another 
result implied by the structural model presented in our 1999 paper.  Namely, we show 
theoretically that the impact of trade on the welfare of factors of production that are employed in 
a particular sector depends on the rates of labor market turnover associated with that sector.  At 
one extreme, with no turnover, the model behaves identically to a Ricardo-Viner specific-factors 
model.  At the other extreme, with infinite turnover, the model behaves identically to a 33 
Heckscher-Ohlin model with Stolper-Samuelson effects.  More generally, the impact of trade on 
worker welfare is a weighted average of the two effects, with the relative weight given to each 
determined by the degree of turnover.  We find substantial support for this relationship using 
data on political contributions to Congress, Congressional voting patterns, and job destruction.  
See Magee, Davidson, and Matusz (2003). 
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  Figure 3.  Correlating US-Canada Trade With Cross-Country Differences in Labor Market Turnover  
 
    DHS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data    BLS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data 
Independent  
Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
               
















               
















               
Controls   No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
               
Year  
Dummies 
  No No Yes  Yes    No No Yes  Yes 
               
2 R    0.0424 0.1300 0.0737 0.1499  0.2360 0.2819 0.2375 0.2827 
               
N    6258 6258 6258 6258    530  530  530  530 
The dependent variable is  t i T , , normalized net exports.  Estimated coefficients are in the body of 
the table, with p-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 1.  Baseline Regressions Relating Normalized Net Exports to Labor Market Turnover 
  
    DHS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data    BLS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data 
Independent  
Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
               
















               
















               
Controls   No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
               
Year  
Dummies 
  No No Yes  Yes    No No Yes  Yes 
               
2SLS    Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
N    5364 5364 5364 5364    318  318  318  318 
The dependent variable in the second stage regression is t i T , , normalized net exports.  Estimated 
coefficients from the second stage are in the body of the table, with p-values in parentheses. One-
period and two-period lags of  t i b ,  and  t i e ,  were used as instruments in the first stage. 
 
Table 2.  Two Stage Least Squares Regressions Relating Normalized Net Exports to Turnover  
 
    DHS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data    BLS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data 
Independent 
Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
              
















               
















               
















               
















              
Controls   No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
              
Year  
Dummies 
  No No Yes  Yes    No No Yes  Yes 
              
2 R    0.1329 0.1818 0.1604 0.1955  0.2591 0.2943 0.2600 0.2948 
               
N    6258 6258 6258 6258    530  530  530  530 
The dependent variable is  t i T , , normalized net exports.  Estimated coefficients are in the body of 
the table, with p-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 3.  Average Labor Market Turnover, Deviations from Average, and Trade  
 
    DHS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data    BLS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data 
Independent  
Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
               
















               
















               
Controls   No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
               
Year  
Dummies 
  No No Yes  Yes    No No Yes  Yes 
               
Sector Fixed 
Effects 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
2 R    0.0422 0.0238 0.0375 0.0057  0.0086 0.0061 0.0058 0.0025 
               
N    6258 6258 6258 6258    530  530  530  530 
The dependent variable is  t i T , , normalized net exports.  Estimated coefficients are in the body of 
the table, with p-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 4.  Regressions Controlling for Sector-Specific Fixed Effects  
 
    DHS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data    BLS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data 
Independent  
Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
               
































































































































































Controls   No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
Year  
Dummies 
  No No Yes  Yes    No No Yes  Yes 
2 R    0.0442 0.0893 0.0355 0.1527  0.3086 0.3502 0.3119 0.3512 
               
N    6258 3080 3080 6258    530  530  530  530 
The dependent variable is  t i T , , normalized net exports.  Estimated coefficients are in the body of 
the table, with p-values in parentheses.  Estimated coefficients are in the body of the table, with 
p-values in parentheses.  The variable ( ) t i z I ,  equals one if  t i b , and  t i e ,  both lie in the lower or 
upper z-percent of their respective distributions, zero otherwise. 
 
Table 5.  Intermediate Regression Results Used in Constructing Table 6  
    DHS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data    BLS 4-Digit SIC Turnover Data 
Coefficients    (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                  
































































































































































Controls    No Yes No Yes    No  Yes  No  Yes 
Year  
Dummies 
  No No Yes  Yes    No No Yes  Yes 
2 R     0.0442 0.0893 0.0355 0.1527    0.3086  0.3502  0.3119  0.3512 
                  
N    6258 3080 3080 6258    530 530 530 530 
The dependent variable is  t i T , , normalized net exports.  Estimated coefficients are in the body of the table, with p-values 
in parentheses. The sum of estimated coefficients are in the body of the table, with p-values in parentheses.  The 
coefficient  100 β   is the coefficient of  t i b , ,  10 β   is the coefficient of  ( ) t i t i b I , , 10 × , and so on.  Analogously,  100 γ  is the 
coefficient of  t i e , , and so on. 
 
 
Table 6.  High (Low) Job Destruction Combined with High (Low) Job Creation and Net Exports 
 